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Risk Assessments are the Diagnosis not the 
Cure: How Using Algorithms as Diagnostic 
Tools Can Prevent the Bait-And-Switch of 
Unconstitutional Pretrial Practices 
Yara M. Wahba  
INTRODUCTION 
“In our society, liberty is the norm and detention prior to trial 
or without trial is the carefully limited exception.”1 
While the Supreme Court has emphasized the exceptional 
nature of infringements on any individual’s liberty, the reality of 
our criminal justice system contradicts this sentiment. 
Marginalized people,2 whether because of race or socioeconomic 
status, disproportionately find themselves as the exception to 
this rule—the exception to laws that are intended to protect all 
Americans equally.3 Where liberty is the norm, it is not the norm 
for people of color.4 Where pretrial detention is the carefully 
limited exception, it is not the carefully limited exception for 
people of color.5 Where the presumption of innocence is a tenet to 
be fiercely protected, it is not fiercely protected for people of 
color.6  
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 1 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987). 
 2 Throughout this Article, marginalization refers to racial identification and 
socioeconomic status—often times race and socioeconomic status interplay. This Article is 
not generalizing that all people of color are of low socioeconomic status or that all people 
of low socioeconomic status are people of color. However, U.S. history and the laws set in 
place because of that history make it difficult to address one without the other. 
 3 See S.B. 10, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018), 132 HARV. L. REV. 2098, 2107 (2019). 
 4 Id. 
 5 Id. 
 6 These sentiments describe overall trends in the criminal justice system, with the 
understanding that there will always be outliers. See S.B. 10, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. 
(Cal. 2018), supra note 3 at 2098; see also Bryce Covert, A Bail Reform Tool Intended to 
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In United States v. Salerno, quoted above, the Supreme Court 
held that in certain situations, the Government’s regulatory 
interest in community safety outweighs an individual’s interest in 
liberty.7 For this reason, the Court found the Bail Reform Act of 
19848 facially valid and not a violation of a defendant’s 
constitutional rights.9 It did not infringe upon the carefully limited 
exception the Court delineated in Salerno.10 But while this Act and 
others like it are not facially invalid and are—in theory—designed 
to protect all people equally, in practice these laws do not perform 
as they are intended.11 As for the reality of the cash bail system, 
indigent individuals’ liberties are not protected at all costs and 
detention is not the carefully limited exception. In fact, the 
opposite is true: detention is the norm, and liberty is the carefully 
limited exception.  
In an effort to remedy this harsh reality and even the 
playing field regarding enforcement of these laws, bail reform 
has increasingly shifted toward pretrial risk assessments—the 
tool designed to “replace judicial instincts with validated 
algorithms and . . . reserve detention for high-risk defendants.”12 
Modern criminal justice reform literature discusses at length the 
propriety and impropriety of risk assessments, but there is a gap 
in the literature as to a solution that combines the ideas and 
concerns of both critics and advocates.13 
Part I of this Article surveys the history of bail, which dates 
back to Anglo-Saxon England with the use of “bots” to pay 
 
Curb Mass Incarceration has only Replicated Biases in the Criminal Justice System, 
INTERCEPT (July 12, 2020, 5:00 AM), http://theintercept.com/2020/07/12/risk-assessment-
tools-bail-reform/ [http://perma.cc/RQ4Q-52VE]. 
 7 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 751–52 (1987). 
 8 The Bail Reform Act of 1984 mandated “‘pretrial release of the person on personal 
recognizance, or upon execution of an unsecured appearance bond in an amount specified by 
the court . . . unless the judicial officer determines that such release will not reasonably assure 
the appearance of the person as required or will endanger the safety of any other person or the 
community.’ The Act further provides that if, after a hearing, ‘the judicial officer finds that no 
condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person (as 
required) and the safety of any other person and the community, such judicial officer shall 
order the detention of the person before trial.’” The Act creates a rebuttable presumption 
toward confinement when the person has committed certain delineated offenses, such as 
crimes of violence or serious drug crimes. TIMOTHY R. SCHNACKE ET AL., PRETRIAL JUSTICE 
INSTITUTE, THE HISTORY OF BAIL AND PRETRIAL RELEASE 17–18 (Sept. 24, 2010), 
http://b.3cdn.net/crjustice/2b990da76de40361b6_rzm6ii4zp.pdf [http://perma.cc/K3B2-7AKJ]. 
 9 Salerno, 481 U.S. at 755. 
 10 Id.  
 11 See S.B. 10, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018), supra note 3 at 2098; see also 
Covert, supra note 6. 
 12 Note, Bail Reform and Risk Assessment: The Cautionary Tale of Federal 
Sentencing, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1125, 1125 (2018). 
 13 Critics of risk assessments propose complete abandonment of the tool, while 
advocates support its use. The literature is underdeveloped with solutions that 
meaningfully combine the efforts and concerns of both sides.  
Do Not Delete 5/17/2021 12:41 PM 
2021] Risk Assessments are the Diagnosis not the Cure 577 
reparations to victims.14 With the Norman Conquest of England, 
the system shifted its focus away from victims toward pretrial 
detention and punishment for the offender.15 To prevent the 
unchecked discretion sheriffs and judges exercised over pretrial 
decisions, the British wrote a prohibition against excessive bail 
into the English Bill of Rights.16 Colonial American States then 
penned this same language into their state constitutions.17 
However, with the emergence of bail bondsmen, bail in the U.S. 
morphed into an industry that functions more as a corporate 
machine than a public service.18  
Part II of this Article addresses the problems caused by cash 
bail, including the large number of individuals—more than 550,000 
at last count—in jail awaiting trial or sentencing, notwithstanding 
the presumption of ‘innocent until proven guilty’.19 Many defendants 
who cannot post bond face only minor charges and spend more time 
behind bars during the pretrial phase, where they “enjoy” the 
presumption of innocence, than they ever would if convicted.20 
Part III discusses modern efforts at bail reform, specifically 
SB 10—California’s recent proposal. SB 10 was a product of the 
Chief Justice of California’s charge for reevaluation of 
California’s current bail system.21 Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye 
tasked a working group of diverse judges with researching and 
reporting on the current cash bail system.22 This bill acts as a 
model of how risk assessments can be used to release all low-risk 
offenders who do not present a threat to public safety and detain 
high risk offenders who do. Risk assessments are a tool used to 
enhance judicial discretion, not replace it.23 
Due to the difficulty in implementing reform that resolves 
problems and the lack of a workable solution, Part IV of this Article 
evaluates the two main schools of thought on bail reform: advocates 
and critics of risk assessments. Those who advocate for risk 
assessments urge it is prudent to replace human subjectivity with a 
 
 14 See infra Part I. 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. 
 19 See Wendy Sawyer & Peter Wagner, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2020, PRISON 
POL’Y INITIATIVE (Mar. 24, 2020), http://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2020.html 
[http://perma.cc/EZ6G-U6KU]. 
 20 Cynthia E. Jones, “Give Us Free”: Addressing Racial Disparities in Bail 
Determinations, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 919, 935–36 (2013). 
 21 Bail Reform Act of 2018, S.B. 10, 2019-2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018) (codified as law in 
Chapter 244 on August 28, 2018); State of the Judiciary March 2016, CAL. COURTS (Mar. 8, 
2016, 4:00 PM), http://www.courts.ca.gov/34477.htm [http://perma.cc/BDE4-6LN6]. 
 22 State of the Judiciary March 2016, supra note 21. 
 23 Id. 
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consistent algorithm,24 while those who criticize these assessments 
argue that by using racially entrenched data, risk assessments 
further perpetuate racially discriminatory practices.25 Champions of 
risk assessments have valid concerns about the efficacy and 
constitutionality of the cash bail system, while critics of risk 
assessments have valid concerns about the efficacy and 
constitutionality of these proposed algorithms.  
Often with reform, the lack of a perfect solution inhibits 
change. Part V of this Article proposes a comprehensive solution by 
taking the best arguments from both sides of the risk assessment 
aisle and compiles them into a three-fold working solution that 
recognizes the value of risk assessments while discouraging its 
potential for discriminatory effects.26 This three-part solution is to 
be implemented as one cohesive operation—each component 
depends on the other functioning properly.  
First, risk assessments should be used diagnostically prior to 
arraignment to direct a defendant’s next step in the pretrial 
release process, ultimately releasing defendants charged with 
misdemeanors assessed as “low risk” within a matter of hours 
after their arrest. Second, the agency that administers the risk 
assessments should be a Pretrial Assessment Services Agency 
that is a separate, independent branch under the umbrella of the 
court, not the probation department. Finally, to encourage risk 
assessments as an enhancement rather than a replacement to 
judicial discretion, judges must be trained on how to recognize 
bias both in the courtroom and in the data.27 Judges should be 
required to make tentative rulings on the record given all the 
information about a defendant on paper, before ever confronting 
the defendant. A judge wishing to change the tentative ruling 
must state her reasons for doing so on the record at the bail 
hearing. Additionally, there must be an effort to diversify the 
bench itself. If judges are to retain their discretion, it is 
imperative they recognize how their decisions may be disparately 
impacting people of color and perpetuating marginalization.  
 
 24 See Megan Stevenson, Assessing Risk Assessment in Action, 103 MINN. L. REV. 
303, 317 (2018). 
 25 Vienna Thompkins, What Are Risk Assessments—and How Do They Advance 
Criminal Justice Reform?, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Aug. 23, 2018), 
http://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/what-are-risk-assessments-and-
how-do-they-advance-criminal-justice-reform [http://perma.cc/GYY2-PYDF]. 
 26 See infra Part V. 
 27 Biased data refers to data that may not be probative of a person’s flight risk, 
either because they are part of a demographic more likely to be accused of crimes, and in 
turn more likely to be arrested, and thus, more likely to receive an inflated assessment of 
risk. 
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I. HISTORY OF BAIL 
“Bail emerged to solve a problem we still grapple with 
today—balancing the general right of defendants to pre-trial 
freedom with the need of society to protect against flight and 
ensure punishment.”28 The concept of bail has its origins in 
Anglo-Saxon England. Criminal wrongs were settled through 
“bots,” which were amends or reparations paid to the victim or 
person wronged.29 Crimes were private affairs and were not 
prosecuted in the name of the state as they are today.30 Wrongs 
were righted with money, not imprisonment.31 However, in a 
select number of cases, persons considered dangerous or a threat 
to the public were mutilated or executed.32  
Anglo-Saxons had two primary motivations: securing public 
safety and ensuring the accused did not escape the consequences 
of their actions.33 “Thus, a system was created in which the 
defendant was required to find a surety who would provide a 
pledge to guarantee both the appearance of the accused in court 
and payment of the bot upon conviction.”34 That pledge was 
quantified to equal the amount of the penalty.35 This was called 
“bail.”36  
This bail system ensured that if the “accused were to flee, 
the responsible surety would pay the entire amount to the 
private accuser, and the matter was done.”37  
Since the amount of the pledge and the possible penalty were 
identical, the effect of a successful escape would have been a default 
judgment for the amount of the bot. To the extent the accused left 
behind sufficient property to pay the bot, he would have had no 
incentive for flight. To the extent the surety bore the financial 
responsibility for the payment, he had every incentive to ensure the 
appearance of the accused.38 
Perhaps “[t]he Anglo-Saxon bail process was . . . the last entirely 
rational application of bail.”39  
 
 28 JOHN-MICHAEL SEIBLER & JASON SNEAD, THE HISTORY OF CASH BAIL, HERITAGE 
FOUNDATION 6, 8 (2017). 
 29 SCHNACKE ET AL., supra note 8, at 1. 
 30 Id.  
 31 See id. 
 32 Id. at 1–2. 
 33 See id. at 2. 
 34 Id.  
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id.  
 38 June Carbone, Seeing Through the Emperor’s New Clothes: Rediscovery of Basic 
Principles in the Administration of Bail, 34 SYRACUSE L. REV. 517, 520 (1983). 
 39 Id. 
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Beginning in 1066 with the Norman Conquest of England, 
the bail system shifted away from reparations and toward 
confinement and corporal punishment.40 Executions and 
mutilations were phased out, but corporal punishment 
escalated.41 The possibility of corporal punishment heightened 
the criminal’s desire to flee.42 With the formation of juries,43 
wrongs became less of a private affair and more of a criminal 
process that involved more than just the oppressed and their 
oppressor.44 Criminals were held in confinement by the shire’s 
reeve, equivalent to a county sheriff, and magistrates travelled 
from shire to shire making determinations about who would be 
confined and who would be released.45 Sheriffs were unchecked in 
their pretrial detention decisions and judges unchecked in their 
bail determinations. 46 Abuse and corruption were rampant.47  
In response to this widespread abuse, Parliament passed the 
Statute of Westminster, which took a different approach to bail 
than the Anglo-Saxons but still rearticulated the underlying 
notion “that the bail process must mirror the outcome of the 
trial.”48 The Statute established three criteria that governed a 
bail decision: (1) the nature of the offense; (2) the probability of 
conviction; and (3) the criminal history of the accused.49 “[T]his 
standard governed English bail bond determinations for the next 
five centuries,” but not without continued abuse.50 Judges set bail 
extremely high to place additional obstacles in the way of a 
defendant’s release.51 This abuse eventually led to the prohibition 
against “excessive bail” in the English Bill of Rights of 1689—"a 
phrase similar to that found in the Eighth Amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution.”52  
In 1791, the Framers translated this principle into the Eighth 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which guaranteed a right to 
 
 40 See SCHNACKE ET AL., supra note 8, at 2. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. 
 43 “The exact time of the introduction of the jury trial into England is a question 
much discussed by historians, some of them contending it was developed from laws 
brought over by William the Conqueror, while others point to . . . its existence . . . among 
the Anglo-Saxons prior to the Norman Conquest.” Robert von Moschzisker, Historic 
Origin of Trial by Jury, 70 U. PA. L. REV. & AM. L. REG. 1, 2 (1921). 
 44 See id. at 4. 
 45 SCHNACKE ET AL., supra note 8, at 3. 
 46 Id.  
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. at 4. 
 52 Id. 
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be free of excessive bail, not a right to bail itself.53 But language 
from the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 guaranteeing a right to bail 
itself made its way into most state constitutions by the mid-19th 
century. Section 14, Article 2 stated, “All persons shall . . . be 
bailable by sufficient sureties, except for capital offenses, where 
proof is evident, or presumption great.”54 State constitutions 
interpreted this language as making “risk of flight the only 
legitimate factor . . . in denying bail in non-capital cases.”55 Thus, 
any sort of “infringement on the presumption of innocence was 
justified on the grounds” that the accused was a flight risk.56  
The Supreme Court affirmed this practice in Stack v. Boyle.57 
The Court proclaimed that “[u]nless this right to bail before trial 
is preserved, the presumption of innocence, secured only after 
centuries of struggle, would lose its meaning.”58 In the same vein, 
“[s]ince the function of bail is limited, the fixing of bail for any 
individual defendant must be based upon standards relevant to 
the purpose of assuring the presence of that defendant” at trial.59  
Laws regarding bail seek to accommodate two primary 
concerns: the presumption of innocence and the risk of flight. The 
former must be protected, and the latter must be protected 
against. However, a shift occurred in the 20th century. “As the 
nation grew and urbanized,” the bail bond system morphed into a 
political and lucrative for-profit industry.60 The U.S. is only one 
of two countries that allows for-profit bail bonding (the 
Philippines is the other).61 Beginning in the mid-20th century, 
independent commercial bail companies and bail bond 
 
 53 While some argue that the right to bail is inherent in the Eighth Amendment’s 
protection against non-excessive bail, the Supreme Court has never explicitly held that 
the Constitution affords a right to bail itself. See Donald P. Lay & Jill De La Hunt, The 
Bail Reform Act of 1984: A Discussion, 11 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 929, 945 (1985). In fact, 
in United States v. Salerno, the Court held that the Eighth Amendment does not create a 
right to bail. 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987). See also Thirty-Third Annual Review of Criminal 
Procedure, Bail, 33 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 291, 291 (2004). 
 54 An Ordinance for the Government of the Territory of the United States 
Northwest of the River Ohio, OUR DOCUMENTS, 
http://www.ourdocuments.gov/document_data/document_transcripts/document_00
8_transcript.html [http://perma.cc/M5QX-9AVS]; Kurt X. Metzmeier, Preventive 
Detention: A Comparison of Bail Refusal Practices in the United States, England, 
Canada and Other Common Law Nations , 8 PACE INT’L L. REV. 399, 405 (1996).  
 55 Metzmeier, supra note 54, at 406. 
 56 See id. 
 57 Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 8 (1951). 
 58 Id. at 4. 
 59 Id. at 5.  
 60 Metzmeier, supra note 54, at 406. 
 61 Louis Jacobson, Are U.S., Philippines the Only Two Countries with Money Bail?, 
POLITIFACT (Oct. 9, 2018), http://www.politifact.com/factchecks/2018/oct/09/gavin-
newsom/are-us-philippines-only-two-countries-money-bail/ [http://perma.cc/T84F-BMJV]; 
see also PRETRIAL DETENTION REFORM WORKGROUP, PRETRIAL DETENTION REFORM: 
RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE 33 (2017). 
Do Not Delete 5/17/2021 12:41 PM 
582 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 24:2 
associations began to industrialize and institutionalize the bail 
system.62 Bail bondsmen, unencumbered by any legal restriction, 
“stalked the corridors of city police courts and county houses” to 
arbitrarily set bail on a defendant-by-defendant basis.63 In many 
states, particularly in the South, this practice detrimentally 
affected African Americans because of their lower socio-economic 
status, and became just one building block of their systemic 
disenfranchisement.64 Having no true understanding of “risk,” 
bail bondsman relied on personal judgment and prejudice to 
make these determinations.65 “[W]ealthy and politically 
connected defendants were released, while the poor” were not.66 
Those who fell prey to the commercializing tactics of the industry 
often spent as much time in jail awaiting trial as the time they 
would likely have served if actually convicted.67  
The presumption of innocence that was once so highly valued 
increasingly became overshadowed by the corporate machine that is 
the American cash bail system. Currently, about seventy-four 
percent of American inmates have not been convicted of a crime.68 
Many of these detainees present no flight risk or risk to public 
safety if released.69 So why are these defendants still locked up? As 
has been true for decades, their financial and socioeconomic 
conditions do not afford them an ability to pay the money necessary 
to post bond.70 “If they could pay their bail or bail bondsman’s fee, 
they could walk out the front door and go home.”71 
II. PROBLEMS WITH THE CASH BAIL SYSTEM 
Pretrial detention interrupts a defendant’s life in ways that 
have drastic, lasting impacts. For defendants who pose a risk to 
the safety of their community, this interruption can be justified. 
But for defendants who are shackled to a jail cell because of an 
inability to pay, and not because they present a risk to the 
community, this interruption cannot be justified. Ability to post 
 
 62 PRETRIAL DETENTION REFORM WORKGROUP, supra note 61. 
 63 Metzmeier, supra note 54, at 407. 
 64 Id. at 406–07. 
 65 Id. at 407. 
 66 Id. at 406. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Wendy Sawyer & Peter Wagner, supra note 19. 
 69 See PRETRIAL DETENTION REFORM: RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE, 
supra note 61, at 69. 
 70 See, e.g., SUPERIOR CT. OF CAL. CNTY. OF ORANGE, 2020 UNIFORM BAIL SCHEDULE 
(FELONY AND MISDEMEANOR), at 1 (2020); SUPERIOR CT. OF CAL. CNTY. OF L.A., 2020 BAIL 
SCHEDULE FOR INFRACTIONS AND MISDEMEANORS, at 1 (2020).  
 71 Bail Reform and Risk Assessment: The Cautionary Tale of Federal Sentencing, 
supra note 12, at 1127. 
Do Not Delete 5/17/2021 12:41 PM 
2021] Risk Assessments are the Diagnosis not the Cure 583 
bond is a socioeconomic issue that directly correlates with race.72 
Bail determinations are not color-blind.73 The current cash bail 
system uses a defendant’s financial situation, rather than risk of 
flight, to determine appropriateness of detention.74  
Uprooting a person from their daily routine can destroy their 
employment and housing stability, leave children parentless, and 
instigate and perpetuate idleness.75 Seventy-five percent of pretrial 
detainees have been charged with minor, non-violent crimes such as 
drug offenses,76 yet the impact of pretrial detention is anything but 
minor. Just as punishment should be proportional to the harm 
committed, so should detention prior to trial. But what our current 
cash bail system does is anything but proportional.77  
Not only does pretrial detention disrupt the flow of a 
defendant’s life, but prolonged periods of pretrial detention 
actually increase the defendant’s likelihood of committing 
another crime.78 Even if a defendant is low-risk, when held two to 
three days in detention, that person is almost forty percent more 
likely to commit new crimes than a similarly situated defendant 
who was held no longer than twenty-four hours.79 As the number 
of days in detention increases, so does the likelihood of the 
defendant committing a new crime.80  
Pretrial detention can also affect the outcome of a 
defendant’s case.81 Extended periods of detention effectively force 
defendants into pleading guilty at an early stage in the 
 
 72 See Elizabeth Hinton et al., An Unjust Burden: The Disparate Treatment of Black 
Americans in the Criminal Justice System, VERA INST. OF JUST. 8 (May 2018), 
http://www.vera.org/downloads/publications/for-the-record-unjust-burden-racial-disparities.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/B7XQ-55AF] (“A 2013 review of 50 years of studies on racial disparities in bail 
practices found that black people are subject to pretrial detention more frequently, and have 
bail set at higher amounts, than white people who have similar criminal histories and are 
facing similar charges. Studies documented this disparity in state and federal cases as well as 
juvenile justice proceedings, and in all regions of the country.”).  
 73 See Jones, supra note 20, at 938–42.  
 74 See id. at 921. 
 75 See PRETRIAL DETENTION REFORM: RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE, 
supra note 61, at 13. 
 76 Jones, supra note 20, at 935.  
 77 See, e.g., SUPERIOR CT. OF CAL. CNTY. OF ORANGE, 2020 UNIFORM BAIL SCHEDULE 
(FELONY AND MISDEMEANOR), supra note 70, at 1; SUPERIOR CT. OF CAL. CNTY. OF L.A., 
2020 BAIL SCHEDULE FOR INFRACTIONS AND MISDEMEANORS, supra note 70, at 1. 
 78 Christopher T. Lowenkamp et al., The Hidden Costs of Pretrial Detention, LJAF 3 
(Nov. 2013), http://craftmediabucket.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/PDFs/LJAF_Report_hidden-
costs_FNL.pdf [http://perma.cc/J6JV-ZK2U].  
 79 Id.  
 80 Id.  
 81 See Léon Digard & Elizabeth Swavola, Justice Denied: The Harmful and Lasting Effects of 
Pretrial Detention, VERA INST. OF JUST. 2–3 (April 2019), 
http://www.vera.org/downloads/publications/Justice-Denied-Evidence-Brief.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/D2BF-RC8Y]. 
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proceedings when they otherwise may not have in order to 
“secure their release from custody.”82 Many of these defendants, 
especially first-time offenders, will do whatever it takes to get out 
of jail while awaiting trial.83 
Bail is not only problematic on a micro level, but also on a 
macro level, revealing a larger broken criminal justice system. The 
multitude of people subject to pretrial confinement exacerbates the 
national crisis of jail overcrowding.84 Six out of ten people in jail are 
awaiting trial.85 As such, if we wish to remedy the problem of mass 
incarceration, reforming the bail system is a necessary predicate. 
Our cash bail system is not only disrupting individuals’ personal 
lives—it is perpetuating a larger system of injustice. 
III. SB 10 AS A SPRINGBOARD FOR BAIL REFORM  
As evidenced by its history, the American bail system is 
riddled with injustices which persist to this day. Legislators and 
community activists continue to seek reform. “In 2016, state 
lawmakers in 44 states and the District of Columbia enacted 118 
new laws regarding pretrial detention and release.”86 In an effort 
to decrease the historical disparities endemic in the pretrial 
process, California advanced SB 10, a bill aiming to address bail 
reform. This bill would have effectively eliminated cash bail and 
relied instead on risk assessments for pretrial determinations. 
SB 10 models a bail system that reflects the principle that cash 
bail is inherently flawed, that risk assessments are beneficial 
when utilized in a limited fashion, and that judges cannot be 
completely removed from the process.  
A. History of SB 10  
During her State of the Judiciary address in 2016, Chief 
Justice Tani Cantil-Sakauye called for a review of California’s 
current cash bail system:87  
I think it’s time for us to really ask the question whether or not bail 
effectively serves its purpose, or does it in fact penalize the poor. 
Bail—does it really ensure public safety? Does it in fact assure 
 
 82 PRETRIAL DETENTION REFORM: RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE, supra 
note 61, at 14.  
 83 See id. 
 84 SCHNACKE ET AL., supra note 8, at 10.  
 85 Why are People in Jail Before Trial?, PRETRIAL JUST. INST., 
https://www.pretrial.org/get-involved/learn-more/why-we-need-pretrial-reform/  
(last visited Nov. 27, 2020) [http://perma.cc/7877-SMEX].  
 86 PRETRIAL DETENTION REFORM WORKGROUP, supra note 61, at 18. 
 87 State of the Judiciary March 2016, supra note 21. 
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people’s appearance in court, or would a more effective risk 
assessment tool be as effective for some cases?88  
Motivated by these concerns, Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye 
established a Pretrial Detention Reform Workgroup in October of 
2016.89 This Reform Workgroup consisted of a diverse task force90 
of nine judges and one court executive officer from across the 
state who “studied the bail system, listened to all interested 
stakeholders, discussed the issues and unanimously reached 
these recommendations in the report.”91 After the task force 
spent a year critically studying these issues, “it became clear that 
the current system of money bail fails to adequately address 
public safety and the profound negative impacts on those 
individuals who should not be detained before trial.”92 The 
recommendations of this task force eventually became part of SB 
10, introduced by Senator Robert Hertzberg on December 05, 
2016.93  
After several amendments on the floor of the Assembly and 
the Senate, SB 10 was signed into law by Governor Brown on 
August 28, 2018.94 This law was to take effect on October 01, 
2019.95 However, the day after it was signed, Thomas W. 
Hiltachk, backed by the Californians Against the Reckless Bail 
Scheme, introduced and filed veto referendum 1856 to overturn 
this law.96 The bail bond industry was able to garner opposition 
 
 88 Id. 
 89 PRETRIAL DETENTION REFORM WORKGROUP, supra note 61, at 1.  
 90 This group is diverse in many senses of the word, including their education, 
background, and ethnicity. 
 91 Merrill Balassone, Jud. Council Pub. Affs., Chief Justice Workgroup: Money Bail is 
“Unsafe and Unfair,” CAL. CTS. NEWSROOM (Oct. 24, 2017), 
https://newsroom.courts.ca.gov/news/chief-justice-workgroup-money-bail-is-unsafe-and-
unfair [http://perma.cc/HS3B-U2B6]. 
 92 Id. 
 93 The Pretrial Detention Reform Workgroup’s ten recommendations were: (1) 
implement a robust risk-based pretrial assessment and supervision system to replace the 
current money bail system, (2) expand the use of risk-based preventive detention, (3) 
establish pretrial services in every county, (4) use a validated pretrial risk assessment, (5) 
make early release and detention decisions, (6) integrate victim rights into the system, (7) 
apply pretrial procedures to violations of community supervision, (8) provide adequate 
funding and resources, (9) deliver consistent and comprehensive education, and (10) adopt 
a new framework of legislation and rules of court to implement these recommendations. 
Id. 
 94 Governor Signs SB 10, Eliminating Money Bail in California, SENATE MAJORITY 
LEADER SENATOR ROBERT HERTZBERG (Aug. 28, 2018), 
https://sd18.senate.ca.gov/news/8282018-governor-signs-sb-10-eliminating-money-bail-
california [http://perma.cc/5V6L-TBJX]. 
 95 See Michael McGough, The Fate of California’s Cash Bail Industry will Now Be 
Decided on the 2020 Ballot, SACRAMENTO BEE (Jan. 17, 2019, 1:04 PM), 
https://www.sacbee.com/news/california/article224682595.html [http://perma.cc/5DK4-3VMQ]. 
 96 See id.; see also California Proposition 25, Replace Cash Bail  
with Risk Assessments Referendum (2020), BALLOTPEDIA 
https://ballotpedia.org/California_Proposition_25,_Replace_Cash_Bail_with_Risk_Assess
Do Not Delete 5/17/2021 12:41 PM 
586 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 24:2 
to this bill by labeling its proposed reforms as a system that 
would jeopardize the safety of the community and implement a 
discriminatory risk assessment system—concerns that are widely 
held by critics of risk assessments in general.97 Claiming that SB 
10 would single-handedly decimate a $2-billion nationwide 
industry by abolishing cash bail in California, the bail industry 
did everything it could to halt its implementation.98 For SB 10’s 
opponents to successfully take it out of the hands of the 
legislature, they needed to collect five percent of the total votes 
cast for Governor Brown in the 2014 general election, which 
totaled 365,880 signatures.99 The coalition succeeded, gathering 
far more signatures than necessary.100 By November 20, 2018, 
the coalition had collected more than 575,000 signatures.101 After 
the signatures were verified, the Secretary of State certified the 
initiative on January 16, 2019.102 In less than three months, SB 
10’s opponents had snatched it from the hands of the legislature 
that had toiled over it for years, and placed it instead into the 
hands of voters for the 2020 general election in the form of 
Proposition 25.103  
Just as private interest groups were able to fund a veto 
referendum to secure Proposition 25 a spot on the November 
ballot, they further employed their wealth and influence to 
ensure Proposition 25 did not pass, an effort aided by divisions 
among pro-reform advocates.104 A “yes” vote on Proposition 25 
would have upheld the contested legislation and effectively 
abolished cash bail. A “no” vote would repeal the legislation and 
 
ments_Referendum_(2020) [http://perma.cc/27E6-C9DC] (last visited Feb. 14, 2021). 
 97 See e.g., California Proposition 25, Replace Cash Bail with Risk Assessments 
Referendum (2020), supra note 96; BlackLivesMatter–LA (@BLMLA) Twitter, (Aug. 18, 
2018, 4:37 PM), https://twitter.com/blmla/status/1030961861234122752?lang=en 
[http://perma.cc/8CSS-78BA]. 
 98 2020 California Ballot Propositions, CAL. RENTAL ASS’N 
https://www.naylornetwork.com/ria-nwl/articles/index-
v3.asp?aid=570461&issueID=65741 [http://perma.cc/NGB2-NW5J] (noting there are over 
3,000 registered bail agents in California alone).  
 99 McGough, supra note 96. 
 100 Id.  
 101 Id. 
 102 California Proposition 25, Replace Cash Bail with Risk Assessments Referendum 
(2020), supra note 96.  
 103 See id.  
 104 See Matt Brannon, Props 20 and 25 Failed. What Does That Tell Us About 
Criminal Justice Reform in California?, RECORD SEARCHLIGHT (Nov. 5, 2020, 3:36 PM), 
https://www.redding.com/story/news/local/2020/11/05/california-prop-20-25-criminal-
justice-reform-shasta-county-jail/6180378002/ [http://perma.cc/ZHA5-ST88]; Patrick 
McGreevy, Prop. 25, Which Would Have Abolished California’s Cash Bail System, is 
Rejected by Voters, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2020, 8:49 PM), 
https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-11-03/2020-california-election-prop-25-
results [http://perma.cc/Y7TX-J4TP].  
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maintain the current cash bail system.105 On November 3rd, 2020, 
during one of the most contentious election years, California 
voters voted to repeal SB 10.106 Although 43.59% of voters voted 
to uphold SB 10, 56.41% voted to strike it down.107  
There are two main reasons the proposition did not  
pass: opposition by bail coalition groups108 and opposition by 
progressive activist groups.109 Unsurprisingly, bail coalitions did not 
want their industry and livelihood to collapse. Perhaps more 
surprisingly, progressive activist groups were fragmented in their 
support of SB 10, with some believing the proposed alternative to 
cash bail would actually further racial discrimination within the 
criminal justice system.110 Because Proposition 25 failed, California 
finds itself back at square one in regard to bail reform. Now, more 
than ever, a meaningful solution is required, one that anticipates 
the criticisms and opposition the Proposition encountered that 
ultimately led to its demise. 
B. What the Bill Proposed 
SB 10 sought to condition a defendant’s eligibility for release 
on their risk rather than their charge.111 The goal was to achieve 
a “just and fair pretrial release and detention system [that] 
provides due process, recognizes the presumption of innocence, 
and advances the government’s fundamental role in protecting 
public safety.”112 The current bail system does not treat pretrial 
detention as a “carefully limited exception” to the presumption of 
innocence across all racial groups alike. SB 10 aimed for counties 
to impose the least-restrictive nonmonetary condition (or 
combination of conditions) that would have reasonably assured 
public safety and the suspect’s return to court.113 
 
 105 California Proposition 25, Replace Cash Bail with Risk Assessments Referendum 
(2020), supra note 96. 
 106 Id.  
 107 Id. 
 108 See 2020 California Ballot Propositions, CAL. RENTAL ASS’N, 
https://www.naylornetwork.com/ria-nwl/articles/index-v3.asp?aid=570461&issueID=65741 
[http://perma.cc/GH4R-FXSR] (last visited Jan. 2, 2021). 
 109 Marisa Lagos, Proposition 25 Would End Cash Bail. So Why Are Some Progressive 
Groups Against It?, KQED (Oct. 7, 2020), https://www.kqed.org/news/11841209/proposition-
25-would-end-cash-bail-so-why-are-some-progressive-groups-against-it 
[http://perma.cc/X7RV-32TS] (last visited Jan. 2, 2021). 
 110 See Anabel Munoz, California Prop. 25 Explained: Voters to Decide Whether to 
End State’s Cash-Bail System, ABC (Oct. 30, 2020), https://abc7.com/prop-25-cash-bail-
proposition-california/7482465/ [http://perma.cc/M4UY-8CYG] (last visited Jan. 2, 2021). 
 111 See S.B. 10, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018) (codified as law in Chapter 244 on 
August 28, 2018). 
 112 PRETRIAL DETENTION REFORM WORKGROUP, supra note 52. 
 113 See S.B. 10, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018) (codified as law in Chapter 244 on 
August 28, 2018). 
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The law contemplates bail through four pretrial stages: (1) 
book and release, (2) pre-arraignment review, (3) arraignment 
hearing, and (4) preventive detention hearing.114  
1. Book and Release  
The law attempted to effectuate its purpose of safely releasing 
as many defendants as possible in part by providing the opportunity 
for most misdemeanants to be released within twelve hours of 
booking.115 A person arrested or detained for a misdemeanor would 
be released by the booking agency within twelve hours of booking, 
unless any of the ten enumerated exceptions applied.116 If one of 
these exceptions applied, then the law deemed the suspect ineligible 
for immediate117 book and release and mandated that he or she be 
held until pre-arraignment review.118 At this stage of detention, risk 
assessments were not implemented. Instead, arrestees were 
separated based upon set criteria—the ten exceptions. If an arrestee 
was charged with a misdemeanor and one of the ten exceptions did 
not apply, they would be released. If charged with a felony, the 
arrestee was ineligible for immediate release and had to undergo 
pre-arraignment review. 
2. Pre-Arraignment Review  
The next stage was pre-arraignment review, which applied 
to any rollover misdemeanants from book and release who were 
ineligible for immediate release, and to most people charged with 
felonies.119 These two categories of people were to be assessed by 
Pretrial Assessment Services (“PAS”) within twenty-four hours of 
booking.120 As defined by the bill:  
 
 114 See id. 
 115 See id. 
 116 See id. The statute carves out the following exceptions from the automatic release 
provisions: (1) Any offense found in Cal. Penal Code section 290; (2) the suspect is charged 
with a domestic violence crime such as 273.4, 243(e)(1), and certain violations of domestic 
violence restraining order like 273.5 or stalking; (3) the suspect is charged with their 
third DUI at a BAC of .20 of higher; (4) the suspect has been arrested for a restraining 
order violation within the last five years; (5) the suspect has three or more prior warrants 
for “failure to appear” within the past 12 months; (6) the suspect is pending trial or 
sentencing on a misdemeanor or a felony; (7) the suspect is on formal probation or post-
conviction supervision; (8) the suspect has intimidated, dissuaded, or threatened 
retaliation against a witness or victim of the current crime; (9) the suspect has violated a 
condition of pretrial release within the past five years; or (10) the person has a serious or 
violent felony prior within the last five years. Id. 
 117 See S.B. 10, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018) (codified as law in Chapter 244 on 
August 28, 2018) (the term “immediate” in this context means within 12 hours). 
 118 Id. 
 119 Id. 
 120 Id. 
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“Pretrial Assessment Services” means an entity, division, or program 
that is assigned the responsibility . . . to assess the risk level of 
persons charged with the commission of a crime, report the results of 
the risk determination to the court, and make recommendations for 
conditions of release of individuals pending adjudication of their 
criminal case, and as directed under statute or rule of court, 
implement risk-based determinations regarding release and 
detention.121  
PAS would then use the suspect’s information to conduct a 
risk assessment based on a validated tool122 which would assign 
the suspect a score, and that would categorize them as low risk, 
medium risk, or high risk based on that score.123 It is at this 
stage of review that the risk assessment tool would be used 
“diagnostically.” PAS would input the arrestee’s data into the 
tool, and the algorithm will then “diagnose” the arrestee’s risk 
and direct the next step.124  
For suspects deemed “high risk,” their next step would be to 
await arraignment, where a judge could review their detention 
status because they could not, by law, be released by Pretrial 
Services.125 For suspects whom the algorithm deemed low risk,126 
their next step would be release on their own recognizance (“OR”) 
by PAS.127 Finally, for suspects whom the algorithm deemed 
“medium risk“,128 their next step was further review either by 
 
 121 Id. 
 122 S.B.10, 2019-2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018) (codified as law in Chapter 244 on August 
28, 2018). 
‘Validated risk assessment tool’ means a risk assessment instrument, selected 
and approved by the court, in consultation with Pretrial Assessment Services 
or another entity providing pretrial risk assessments, from the list of approved 
pretrial risk assessment tools maintained by the Judicial Council. The 
assessment tools shall be demonstrated by scientific research to be accurate 
and reliable in assessing the risk of a person failing to appear in court as 
required or the risk to public safety due to the commission of a new criminal 
offense if the person is released before adjudication of his or her current 
criminal offense and minimize bias. 
 123 Id. 
 124 Id. 
 125 See id.  
 126 Id. 
‘Low risk’ means that an arrested person, after determination of the person’s 
risk following an investigation by Pretrial Assessment Services, including the 
use of a validated risk assessment tool, was categorized as having a minimal 
level of risk of failure to appear in court as required or risk to public safety due 
to the commission of a new criminal offense while released on the current 
criminal offense. 
 127 This did not apply if the individual meets one of the ten exceptions discussed 
above. Id. 
 128 Id. 
‘Medium risk’ means that an arrested person, after determination of the 
person’s risk following an investigation by Pretrial Assessment Services, 
including the use of a validated risk assessment tool, was categorized as 
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PAS or by the courts. If PAS conducted the review, it would 
gather more information and then determine whether the 
suspect be released on their own recognizance or, alternatively, 
under supervised own recognizance (“SOR”).129 If the courts 
conducted the pre-arraignment review,130 either a judge on-call or 
a judicial officer would further analyze and determine whether 
the suspect would be released OR or SOR, or else be detained 
until arraignment.131 
3. Arraignment Hearing  
All suspects still in custody and not released through the 
previous two stages were entitled to a release or detention 
determination at arraignment.132 At this stage, victims were 
notified and given an opportunity to be heard.133 The court had 
the discretion to modify the conditions of release upon request by 
either party.134 It is also at this stage that the District Attorney 
was able to file a motion for preventive detention, which would 
allow the court to detain the defendant pending a hearing.135 
There were only certain enumerated circumstances, usually 
involving heightened danger of the suspect, that allowed a 
prosecutor to seek preventive detention.136 Once this motion was 
 
having a moderate level of risk of failure to appear in court as required or risk 
to public safety due to the commission of a new criminal offense while released 
on the current criminal offense. 
 129 If reviewed by PAS, the suspect was required to be detained if they met one of the 
ten criteria discussed in footnote 116, supra. If not, then the suspect had to be released 
either on their own recognizance or supervised own recognizance, “with the least 
restrictive nonmonetary condition or combination of conditions that [would] reasonably 
assure public safety and the person’s return to court.” Id. 
 130 “Medium risk” suspects and those that fell within the 10 criteria had to be either 
detained by PAS until arraignment or reviewed by the court, and the court had to use the 
pretrial assessment services information and consider their options for release. Id. 
 131 For a medium risk defendant who is further reviewed by the court prior to 
arraignment, a judge could decide to detain the defendant until arraignment only if there 
is a substantial likelihood that no condition will reasonably assure public safety or the 
defendant’s return to court. Id. 
 132 Id. 
 133 Id. 
 134 Id. 
 135 Note that the court cannot initiate a preventive detention hearing on its own 
motion. See id. 
 136 (1) The crime for which the person was arrested was committed with violence 
against a person, threatened violence, or the likelihood of serious bodily injury, or was one 
in which the person was personally armed with or personally used a deadly weapon or 
firearm in the commission of the crime, or was one in which he or she personally inflicted 
great bodily injury in the commission of the crime. 
(2) At the time of arrest, the defendant was on any form of postconviction supervision 
other than informal probation or court supervision. 
(3) At the time of arrest, the defendant was subject to a pending trial or sentencing on a 
felony matter. 
(4) The defendant intimidated or threatened retaliation against a witness or victim of the 
current crime. 
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filed, the court had to determine whether to release the 
defendant or else detain him pending the preventive detention 
hearing. If the court determined there was a “substantial 
likelihood that no nonmonetary condition or combination of 
conditions of pretrial supervision” could reasonably assure either 
the appearance of the defendant at the preventive detention 
hearing or reasonably assure public safety prior to the preventive 
detention hearing, the court could detain the defendant pending 
this hearing, but it had to state its reasons for doing so on the 
record.137 
4. Preventive Detention Hearing 
A suspect found to need preventive detention was either 
violent or high-risk as defined by the statute.138 They were 
entitled to a hearing within three days of arraignment.139 At this 
stage, there was a rebuttable presumption that the defendant 
needed to be detained.140 For the court to find it necessary for a 
suspect to be preventively detained, the court had to make two 
findings: (1) there was probable cause to believe the defendant 
committed the charged crime where there was no indictment and 
the defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, and (2) 
there was clear and convincing evidence that no condition or 
combination of conditions could reasonably assure the protection 
of the public or the appearance of the defendant in court.141 The 
court had to then state the reasons for its determination on the 
record.142 This assured that the court was recognizing and 
working to protect both the suspect’s presumption of innocence 
(by finding that there is probable cause) while also protecting the 
community against danger and assuring the defendant’s return 
to court.143 
 
(5) There is substantial reason to believe that no nonmonetary condition or combination of 
conditions of pretrial supervision will reasonably assure protection of the public or a 
victim, or the appearance of the defendant in court as required. Id. 
 137 Id. 
 138 Id. 
‘High risk’ means that an arrested person, after determination of the person’s 
risk following an investigation by Pretrial Assessment Services, including the 
use of a validated risk assessment tool, is categorized as having a significant 
level of risk of failure to appear in court as required or risk to public safety due 
to the commission of a new criminal offense while released on the current 
criminal offense. 
 139 Id.  
 140 Id.  
 141 Id. 
 142 Id. 
 143 See id.  
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A court could consider many of the same factors they would 
consider under California Penal Code section 1275 when deciding 
whether to release a suspect on bail:144 the nature and 
circumstances of the crime charged as well as the risk to the 
community posed by the defendant’s release, the weight of 
evidence against the defendant, the defendant’s past conduct, 
family and community ties, criminal history, and record for court 
appearances.145 The court could also consider if the defendant 
was on probation, parole, or some other type of supervised 
release pending trial, sentencing or appeal. Additionally, the 
court could look to the recommendation of Pretrial Assessment 
Services obtained using a validated risk assessment 
instrument.146 The court could then evaluate the “impact of 
detention on the defendant’s family responsibilities and 
community ties, employment, and participation in education.”147 
In this way, SB 10 would have allowed considerations that have 
never been statutorily recognized.148 
SB 10 proposed that the Judicial Council should maintain a 
list of validated risk assessments from which each county could 
choose.149 It also proposed that these pretrial assessment services 
be performed by either court employees or a third party qualified 
local public agency.150  
Although this bill may not perfect—as few pieces of 
legislation ever are—it is evident that the Task Force 
thoughtfully considered the multiple levels and layers to bail and 
the consequences of reforming our current system. At best, SB 10 
protects the presumption of innocence by generously limiting 
pretrial detention, while combining algorithmic tools with 
modified judicial discretion. At worst, SB 10 provides a solid 
platform from which other states can build, as it clearly takes 
 
 144 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1275 (2020). 
 145 Id. 
 146 S.B.10, 2017-2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018) (codified as law in Chapter 244 on August 
28, 2018). 
 147 Id. 
 148 While California Penal Code section 1272.1 gives judges the ability to evaluate the 
defendant’s ties to the community and his/her family “attachments,” the word 
“responsibilities” is never mentioned in the statute. The word “responsibilities” indicates 
to the judge that other people, not just the defendant, will be impacted by pretrial 
detention. For example, it is possible that the defendant is the sole caregiver for young 
children or elderly parents, and SB 10 would have allowed the judge to account for such 
responsibilities when making his/her decision. Additionally, the present statutes do not 
currently permit judges to consider participation in education when determining pretrial 
release. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1272.1 (2020). 
 149 S.B.10, 2017-2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018) (codified as law in Chapter 244 on August 
28, 2018). 
 150 Id. 
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into consideration the multitude of problems our current cash 
bail system presents.  
IV. THE MULTIPLE GOALS OF BAIL REFORM 
Bail reform is a complex and arduous process in large part 
because it does not have one singular goal.151 As an illustration, 
consider a sports team that continually loses games. The team 
would be foolish not to adapt its strategy in response to failure, 
because ultimately, its goal is to win. Of course, achieving that 
ultimate goal requires first achieving several smaller goals such 
as greater teamwork, tightening up the team’s defense, and 
better anticipating the other team’s plays. There is one ultimate 
goal, and all sub-goals work toward it. The same cannot be said 
about bail reform. 
Not only does the fight to reform the bail system contain 
multiple goals, but some of these goals clash with each other. 
Accomplishing one goal may come at the expense of another.152 
Bail reform seeks to accomplish a myriad of objectives, ranging 
from “preserving the presumption of innocence for people charged 
with crimes, imposing the least restrictive conditions on release, 
protecting the public from people charged with crimes, ensuring 
that people return to court, imposing detention in a racially and 
economically fair way, and reducing America’s astounding 
pretrial incarceration rate.”153 The presence of multiple, 
competing goals naturally generates intense debate regarding 
what bail reform ought to look like.  
Given this division, it is unsurprising that politicians and 
activists cannot reach a consensus.154 Danny Montes, the 
Alliances Director for Californians for Safety and Justice tweeted 
in support of SB 10, “Why Californians Need #BailReform ‘If 
someone can afford their bail even though they are a threat to 
public safety, they’re free to go.” Taking an opposing view, New 
York Legal Aid’s Decarceration Project responded: “Sorry, you 
have it backwards. Our bail system should prioritize release and 
decarceration above all else.”155 This exchange is just one 
example of how reform-minded, anticipated allies can spiral into 
stalemate based upon which bail reform goals matter most to 
them. 
 
 151 Bail Reform and Risk Assessment: The Cautionary Tale of Federal Sentencing, 
supra note 12, at 1144. 
 152 Id.  
 153 Id. 
 154 See id. 
 155 Id.; see also DecarcerationProject (@DecarcerateNYC), TWITTER (Aug. 17, 2017, 2:07 PM), 
https://twitter.com/DecarcerateNYC/status/898290148550389760 [http://perma.cc/A7YN-M3M5]. 
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V. RISK ASSESSMENT ADVOCATES 
The arguments in favor of implementing risk assessments 
for pretrial decisions are intuitive. One well-supported argument 
for adopting risk assessments is that replacing human judgment 
with algorithms produces more consistent results.156 To this 
point, one author noted, “[F]ormal, actuarial, and algorithmic 
methods of prediction perform better than the intuitive methods 
used by judges or other experts.”157 By replacing human 
discretion with formulaic algorithms, pretrial detention decisions 
can be standardized and streamlined.158 The idea that actuarial 
tools perform better than human intuition at predicting crime 
comes from 1950s–1980s psychology research.159 A meta-analysis 
of the literature in this area160 shows that algorithms are ten 
percent more accurate than human clinical predictions.161 
However, not all these advocates of risk assessments believe 
they are a perfect tool. “Santa Barbara Probation Chief Tanja 
Heitman, whose county has been experimenting with 
alternatives to money bail, said she believes risk assessments 
can actually help reduce racial disparities.”162 Although youth of 
color are 2.6 times more likely to get arrested than their white 
counterparts in Santa Barbara County, their release rates are 
identical.163 Heitman has seen the risk assessment tool erase 
certain racial biases in the juvenile criminal justice system in her 
county.164 Notwithstanding the tool’s lack of perfection, risk 
assessment advocates still support the tool’s ability to weed out 
racial biases present within determination decisions. 
The second argument in favor of risk assessments is that 
pretrial detention decisions should be conditioned upon true risk, 
not ability to pay. These advocates have a particular problem 
with the cash aspect of the current bail system. Supporters of the 
Detention decisions should be made based on true risk of flight 
and likelihood of committing another crime while out on bail, not 
on ability to pay an arbitrary sum of money.165 “Conversely, 
 
 156 See Stevenson, supra note 24, at 317–22. 
 157 Id. at 321. 
 158 See CHARLES SUMMERS & TIM WILLIS, BUREAU OF JUST. ASSISTANCE U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUST., RESEARCH SUMMARY: PRETRIAL RISK ASSESSMENT 1 (2010). 
 159 Stevenson, supra note 24, at 322. 
 160 This meta-analysis consolidates the data from ten papers that compare algorithms 
to human prediction. Id. 
 161 Id.; William M. Grove et al., Clinical Versus Mechanical Prediction: A Meta-
Analysis, 12 PSYCH. ASSESSMENT 19, 19 (2000). 
 162 Lagos, supra note 109. 
 163 Id. 
 164 Id. 
 165 Stevenson, supra note 24, at 317. 
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wealthy defendants who pose a high risk of serious crime should 
not be released simply because they can afford bail.”166 They 
argue that “conditioning release on money results in racial and 
wealth-based disparities in detention, a waste of taxpayer money, 
and harm to public safety.”167 
VI. RISK ASSESSMENT CRITICS 
Unlike risk assessment advocates who find value in replacing 
human judgement with a consistent algorithm, risk assessment 
critics believe the algorithm is just as damning as the data it 
utilizes and is skewed by discriminatory practices. Robin Steinberg, 
The Bail Project’s Chief Executive Officer, argues that “these 
algorithmic assessments are only as good as the data they use.”168 
This data will inevitably reflect the “deeply imbedded racism and 
economic inequity that has driven mass incarceration in the first 
place.”169 While the risk assessment may seem to eliminate the evil 
of cash bail, it simply repackages the type of inequity presented. 
“Whereas defendants were condemned to pre-trial detention prior to 
the bill’s passage due to their poverty and inability to make bail, 
they will now be in pre-trial detention due to their risk 
assessment—which will inevitably be based on their poverty, plus 
their race.”170 
A. Racism Entrenched in the American Criminal Justice 
System 
To understand the staunch opposition to risk assessments, it is 
necessary to understand just how engrained with racism the 
American criminal justice system is, dating back to the 1800s. From 
Jim Crow laws which “codified discrimination and second-class 
status for African Americans”171 to the fight for African American 
suffrage,172 “[r]acial disparities in the criminal justice system have 
deep roots in American history and penal policy.”173 The War on 
Drugs illustrates a law or policy that appears neutral on its face but 
systemically disenfranchised people of color in its effect. Under the 
administration of President Nixon and subsequently of President 
 
 166 Id. at 318. 
 167 Id. at 317–18. 
 168 Arvind Dilawar, What Should Replace Cash Bail?, PAC. STANDARD (Apr. 9, 2019) 
https://psmag.com/social-justice/what-should-replace-cash-bail [http://perma.cc/CZL5-XNFV].  
 169 Id. 
 170 Id. 
 171 Karla Mari McKanders, Sustaining Tiered Personhood: Jim Crow and Anti-
Immigrant Laws, 26 HARV. J. RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 163, 166 (2010). 
 172 Sarah Pruitt, When Did African Americans Actually Get the Right to Vote?, HIST. 
(Jan. 29, 2020), https://www.history.com/news/african-american-voting-right-15th-
amendment [http://perma.cc/E9YL-2JUT]. 
 173 Hinton et al., supra note 72, at 2. 
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Reagan, the War on Drugs was declared an effort to eradicate 
“public enemy number one”: drugs.174 Notwithstanding the genuine 
objectives underlying the War on Drugs, the delivery and 
enforcement of these laws proved disproportionately detrimental to 
people of color because of drug-free zone laws.175 Residential 
segregation had pushed low-income African Americans to high 
density areas of the city, which often included schools, playgrounds, 
and public housing projects.176 The influx of low-income African 
Americans caused the exodus of white people from those areas and 
into the less densely populated suburbs.177 Drug-free zone laws 
prohibited the use or sale of drugs in proximity to certain “zones” 
which were protected areas such as schools, playgrounds, and 
public housing projects.178 This necessarily meant that the majority 
of people affected by these laws were African-Americans since they 
were the ones living in those zones. 
The punishment for using or selling drugs in one of these zones 
could earn someone a punitive sentence, including mandatory 
minimums and sentencing enhancements.179 In certain states, 
defendants convicted of drug-free zone offenses faced a fixed 
mandatory minimum penalty enhancement, which was added 
to any sentence imposed upon them for the underlying drug 
offense.180 While in other states, defendants faced 
enhancements to their presumptive sentencing guidelines 
range.181 Yet, in some states, convictions of offenses within 
drug-free zones raised the felony class of the underlying 
offense which exposed the defendant to a more severe 
penalty.182 Lastly, drug-free zone offenses elevated youth from 
being prosecuted as juveniles to being prosecuted as adults.183 
The War on Drugs is just one example of a law that is 
neutral on its face but racist in its impact. Our history is laden 
with laws that are facially neutral, like the Bail Reform Act 
evaluated in United States v. Salerno, but racially discriminatory 
 
 174 War on Drugs, HIST. (Dec. 17, 2019), https://www.history.com/topics/crime/the-
war-on-drugs [http://perma.cc/VST8-SWCG]; Chris Barber, Public Enemy Number One: A 
Pragmatic Approach to America’s Drug Problem, RICHARD NIXON FOUND. (June 29, 2016), 
https://www.nixonfoundation.org/2016/06/26404/ [http://perma.cc/E3YG-LX36]. 
 175 Hinton et al., supra note 72, at 3. 
 176 Id. 
 177 Id. 
 178 Id. 
 179 Punishments for offenses within the drug-free zones were double the punishment 
for the same offenses committed outside these zones. JUDITH GREENE, KEVIN PRANIS, & 
JASON ZIEDENBERG, DISPARITY BY DESIGN: HOW DRUG-FREE ZONE LAWS IMPACT RACIAL 
DISPARITY—AND FAIL TO PROTECT YOUTH 5 (Just. Pol’y Inst. eds., 2006). 
 180 Id. at 7. 
 181 Id. 
 182 Id. 
 183 Id. 
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in effect.184 Cash bail and the myriad of pretrial detention laws 
that come with it are no exception. 
Such laws have scarred our criminal justice system. People 
of color, particularly African Americans, are disproportionately 
overrepresented in the criminal justice system.185 “Black people 
are incarcerated in state prisons at a rate 5.1 times greater than 
that of white people.”186 For African American men, the 
incarceration rate is more than 3,000 per 100,000 citizens.187 This 
is approximately four times the national average and 
approximately six times the rate among white men.188 Where an 
African American male has a thirty-two percent chance of 
serving time in prison at some point in his life, a white male born 
at the same time would only have a six percent chance of being 
sent to prison.189 The same rings true for African American 
women. Forty-four percent of incarcerated women are black even 
though only about thirteen percent of the female population is 
black.190  
“[T]hese racial disparities are no accident, but rather are 
rooted in a history of oppression and discriminatory decision 
making that have deliberately targeted black people and helped 
create an inaccurate picture of crime that deceptively links them 
with criminality.”191 While some argue that these disparate 
numbers are a result of disparate crime rate because men and 
women of color simply commit more crimes than White men and 
women, 192 such claims have no factual or statistical basis. 
 
 184 See S. 1070, 49 Leg., 2d Sess. (Ariz. 2010) (allowing officers who possess 
“reasonable suspicion” that an individual is unlawfully present in the United States to 
make reasonable attempts to determine the immigration status of that person under the 
Support our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act); see also McClesky v. Kemp, 
481 U.S. 279, 286–87, 320 (1987) (explaining a study that showed the death penalty was 
more often imposed in Georgia on black defendants and killers of white victims than on 
white defendants and killers of black victims); City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 
126–28 (1981) (showing that the road closure had a racially discriminatory effect because 
the only drivers who were inconvenienced by the action were black); Hunter v. 
Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 227 (1985) (finding that section 182 of the Alabama 
Constitution, which provided for the disenfranchisement of persons convicted of crimes 
involving moral turpitude, violated equal protection because even though it was racially 
neutral on its face, the original enactment was motivated by a desire to discriminate 
against blacks on account of race, and the provision had a racially discriminatory impact 
since its adoption). 
 185 See John Conyers, Jr., The Incarceration Explosion, 31 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 377, 
378 (2013). 
 186 Hinton et al., supra note 72, at 2. 
 187 Conyers, supra note 185, at 378. 
 188 Id.  
 189 Id. 
 190 Hinton et al., supra note 72, at 2. 
 191 Id. 
 192 Conyers, supra note 185, at 378. 
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Despite society’s recent progress on social justice issues, 
racism remains entrenched in our criminal justice system. Just 
last year, the San Francisco District Attorney’s Office began a 
process of “blind charging.”193 The office removed all demographic 
and racial information from incident reports before they reached 
the hands of prosecutors in an effort to correct the overcharging 
of African Americans and the undercharging of similarly situated 
white people.194 This was the office’s effort to “directly confront 
[] ingrained racial bias” that leads some prosecutors to charge 
African Americans for low-level drug offenses more frequently 
than their similarly situated white counterparts, “even though 
studies show that white people use illicit drugs at higher 
rates.”195 
B. The Unintended Racist Consequences of Risk Assessments 
If, as critics argue, algorithms are entrenched with racially 
biased data, then the assessments they produce will inevitably be 
discriminatory as well. Can an egg be separated from a cake that 
has already been baked? Of course not. This is exactly how critics of 
the pre-trial risk assessments view the efficacy of these tools—these 
algorithms “bake in” longstanding practices of bias that cannot be 
extracted.196 Matt Watkins, senior writer for the Center for Court 
Innovation, explains “[t]here’s no way to square the circle there, 
taking the bias out of the system by using data generated by a 
system shot through with racial bias” is simply impossible.197 
Critics explain the push for risk assessments as “entrenching 
racial disparities and hiding them behind the rhetoric of 
science”198 If the data used in the risk assessment algorithms is 
heavily engrained with systemic and institutional racism, then 
the output of that algorithm is not going to be a neutral 
evaluation or an accurate representation of the person’s risk.199 
 
 193 Timothy Williams, Black People Are Charged at a Higher Rate Than Whites. What 
if Prosecutors Didn’t Know Their Race?, N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/12/us/prosecutor-race-blind-charging.html 
[http://perma.cc/WE2K-GNVU]. 
 194 Id. 
 195 Id. 
 196 Thompkins, supra note 25. 
 197 Beth Schwartzapfel, Can Racist Algorithms be Fixed?, MARSHALL PROJECT (July 1, 
2019, 6:00 AM), http://www.themarshallproject.org/2019/07/01/can-racist-algorithms-be-
fixed [http://perma.cc/LU53-VVA5]. 
 198 Robin Steinberg, Cash Bail Must be Eliminated, but ‘Risk Assessments’ Aren’t the 
Tool to do it, USA TODAY (Sept. 1, 2018, 12:26 AM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/policing/2018/08/30/california-law-risk-
assessments-bail-justice-system-policing-usa/1043956002/ [http://perma.cc/3GM2-RECF]. 
 199 See generally CTR. ON RACE, INEQ., + THE L. & ACLU, WHAT DOES FAIRNESS LOOK 
LIKE? CONVERSATIONS ON RACE, RISK ASSESSMENT TOOLS, AND PRETRIAL JUSTICE (2018) 
http://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/Final%20Report--ACLU-
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This issue was examined by ProPublica, a non-profit news group 
whose mission is to “expose abuses of power and betrayals of the 
public trust by government, business, and other institutions, 
using the moral force of investigative journalism.”200 In May of 
2016, ProPublica published a study called Machine Bias, which 
criticized risk assessments for their inability to accurately 
predict future risk for defendants detained pre-trial.201 
Specifically, this inaccuracy is skewed toward black defendants. 
ProPublica found the COMPAS risk assessment tool202 produced 
great error in misclassifying black defendants as high risk when 
it did not similarly misclassify white defendants.203 
Bernard Parker, an African American man, and Dylan Fugett, 
a White man, both arrested on drug charges, received massively 
different risk assessment scores. Dylan was rated as a three (low 
risk) and Bernard was rated as a ten (high risk).204 Looking at these 
numbers, one would not know that Fugett had a prior attempted 
burglary conviction whereas Parker only had a non-violent resisting 
arrest conviction.205 After release, Fugett re-offended three times 
with possession of drugs while Bernard did not reoffend even 
once.206 This further confirmed the notion that White people do not 
commit less crimes than their African American counterparts, and 
drugs are not a “black problem.”207 
The following example will, to a certain extent, explain why 
these misclassifications occur.208 If racial group A is arrested at a 
higher rate than racial group B, then a tool that uses arrest rate 




 200 About Us, PROPUBLICA, http://www.propublica.org/about/ [http://perma.cc/W9YC-
RRBP] (last visited May 10, 2020). 
 201 Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), 
http://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing 
[http://perma.cc/33BE-NK3W]. 
 202 COMPAS, which stands for Correctional Offender Management Profiling for 
Alternative Sanctions, is a risk and needs assessment instrument that was first developed 
in 1998 and has evolved several times to reach its most current model—the fourth 
generation. NORTHPOINTE, PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO COMPAS CORE 1 (2019) 
http://www.equivant.com/wp-content/uploads/Practitioners-Guide-to-COMPAS-Core-
040419.pdf [http://perma.cc/TD6K-WGP9]. 
 203 See Angwin et al., supra note 201; SARAH PICARD ET AL., CTR. FOR CT. INNOVATION, 
BEYOND THE ALGORITHM 4 (2019) http://www.courtinnovation.org/publications/beyond-
algorithm [http://perma.cc/FD5U-TSM6]. 
 204 Angwin et al., supra note 201. 
 205 Id. 
 206 See id. 
 207 Id. 
 208 This example is not used to undermine the importance of individuality in risk 
assessments. It is used solely to show how the data plugged into risk assessments can be 
biased from the get-go. 
Do Not Delete 5/17/2021 12:41 PM 
600 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 24:2 
group A as higher risk.209 Group A represents African Americans 
and group B represents Caucasians. Caucasians escape high risk 
determinations because the criminal justice system does not 
target them like it targets African Americans. Certain 
communities, specifically communities of color, have greater 
contact with the criminal justice system simply because of the 
heightened policing that occurs in those communities.210 The 
statistics that result from those interactions do not indicate the 
dangerousness of people of color; if anything, they indicate just 
how targeted police behavior can be.211 Consequently, although 
risk assessments themselves are not biased tools since they are 
merely math equations, these equations are applied to infected 
data. Just as what goes up must come down, what goes in must 
come out. If racially biased data goes in, racially biased results 
must come out. 
VII. A LOOK TO THE FUTURE: A 3-IN-1 SOLUTION 
One might argue that risk assessments should be removed 
entirely from the bail reform discussion, given their potential to 
over-detain and to make false predictions. Risk assessments may 
exacerbate rather than alleviate the issues inherent in the cash 
bail system.212 But eliminating them from the picture is not the 
proper solution. These algorithms can be used as a force to even 
the playing field and not as a math equation that 
disproportionately hurts defendants of color, provided they are 
not used in a vacuum.213 Risk assessments are exactly what their 
name suggests: tools. They are not a magical device that will 
single-handedly solve our country’s discriminatory pre-trial 
detention system. While these tools have the potential to further 
racism and inequality, if used correctly, they could alleviate these 
problems. Consequently, the question is–how do we use them 
correctly? 
The following solution is three-fold. First, these tools must be 
used diagnostically. Second, there must be a system of pretrial 
services dedicated solely to implementing these risk assessments 
and offering pretrial services that will stand in place of 
detention. Third, judges must undergo training that works to 
undo the implicit bias that often permeates pretrial decisions. 
 
 209 CTR. ON RACE, INEQ., + THE L. & ACLU, supra note 199, at 12. 
 210 Id. 
 211 Id. at 13. 
 212 Steinberg, supra note 198. 
 213 CTR. ON RACE, INEQ., + THE L. & ACLU, supra note 189, at 12. 
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A. Solution 1: Using Risk Assessments Diagnostically 
Risk assessments are simply algorithms, but as discussed 
above, they can produce impartial results. To use this double-edged 
sword for good, risk assessments must be used only as diagnostic 
tools to direct either release, further review, or holding until 
arraignment. Risk assessments should not be used as the sole 
determining factor for pretrial detention. Using the tool 
diagnostically means the algorithm is used to diagnose and direct 
the defendant’s next step in the pretrial detention decision process, 
rather than conclusively determine their confinement. Because the 
data used in these algorithms is not always probative of a 
defendant’s flight risk or danger to the community, courts should 
not rely solely on these algorithms to make their pretrial decision or 
use them as a replacement for judicial discretion.214 Using risk 
assessments conclusively without regard for human discretion or 
without implementing various layers of review will inevitably lead 
to skewed results and could very well further entrench the process 
in discriminatory results. 
The Center for Court Innovation conducted an analysis that 
explained what happens when risk assessment tools are used 
diagnostically and what happens when they are used 
conclusively.215 The Center for Court Innovation’s study used real 
data from a sample of New York City defendants from 2015.216 
They tested the data through three models and found that the 
hybrid model, which used the risk assessment diagnostically—as 
explained above—yet still gave judges discretion, produced the 
most racially equivalent results.217 
The study focused on assessing what types of errors the risk 
assessment tool makes.218 After interpreting the findings, the 
Center for Court Innovation concluded not that we should 
eliminate risk assessments, but that we should restrict pretrial 
detention only to defendants charged with violent crimes and 
scored as high-risk.219 This method actually reduces overall 
incarceration and also alleviates racial disparities. Jurisdictions 
need not be confined to their risk assessment tools, but rather 
should utilize them as powerful tools for bail reform; hence, 
Beyond the Algorithm.220 
 
 214 Steinberg supra note 188. 
 215 PICARD et al., supra note 203, at 3. 
 216 The data used in this study was not actually used to inform pretrial decisions; it 
was simply used for research purposes. See id. at 5. 
 217 Id. at 12–13.  
 218 Id. at 3–4.  
 219 Id. at 12. 
 220 Id. at 13–14. 
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The Center for Court Innovation’s findings demonstrate why 
it is important to look beyond the math equation within risk 
assessments and use them to diagnose, not determine. This study 
involved an empirical test of racial bias in risk assessment tools 
and evaluated “whether there are policy-level solutions that 
could conserve the benefits of risk assessment, while also 
addressing valid concerns over racial fairness.”221 The study 
evaluated a risk assessment tool that employs an algorithm that 
combines a defendant’s prior convictions, jail or prison sentences, 
FTAs,222 probation status, charge type, charge severity, 
concurrent open cases, as well as age and gender to generate a 
risk score.223 These categories are weighted and combined to 
generate a numerical score which then translates into one of five 
risk categories: minimal, low, moderate, moderate-high, and 
high-risk categories.224  
This study collected a sample of all arrests made in New York 
City in 2015.225 This included more than 175,000 defendants: 49% 
Black, 36% Hispanic, and 14% white.226 While the tool does not 
explicitly include race as a category because of the constitutional 
problems that would present, the study is conscious of the fact that 
race is embedded into each one of these categories.227 Additionally, 
while it may seem strange that gender is included as a category, its 
inclusion “mitigates the tendency of the tool to over-classify female 
defendants as high-risk.”228  
Ultimately, the study showed that the tool was accurate in its 
predictions of re-arrest regardless of race or ethnicity. Defendants 
classified as high-risk were rearrested at rates of 72% for Blacks, 
71% for Hispanics, and 70% for Whites.229 Similarly, defendants 
categorized at “minimal risk” were only re-arrested at rates of 
11%, 9%, and 10% respectively for those three groups.230 However, 
there were substantial racial differences in re-arrest in the low 
and moderate risk categories.231 The data was then placed into 
three different models of decision-making and the results were 
calculated and analyzed.232  
 
 221 Id. at 3. 
 222 FTA stands for failure to appear. See id. at 15. 
 223 See id. 
 224 See id. at 6. 
 225 Id. at 5. 
 226 Id.  
 227 See id. at 4.  
 228 Id. at 5 
 229 Id. at 6.  
 230 Id.  
 231 Id. 
 232 See id. at 10. 
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1. Scenario 1: Business as Usual  
The first scenario “Business as Usual” involves a system 
where judges maintain their subjective judicial discretion, and 
risk assessments are merely present as suggestions, no matter 
what risk category the defendant is placed in.233 In this scenario, 
real-world differences that exist in pre-trial detention based on 
the person’s race persisted.234 For example, in New York in 2015, 
defendants who were held in detention were 31% Black, 25% 
Hispanic, and 22% White.235 A total of 27% of defendants were 
detained.236 False positives, representing the individuals who 
were classified as high-risk but were not in fact re-arrested on a 
new charge, were found to be rather high. They averaged at 19%, 
with the rate for Blacks 6% higher than the rate for Whites.237  
2. Scenario 2: Risk-Based Approach with an Adjusted  
High-Risk Threshold 
In the second scenario, “Risk-Based Approach with an 
Adjusted High-Risk Threshold,” pretrial detention is based solely 
on the risk-assessment tool and not on judicial discretion.238 Only 
defendants in the highest risk category would be detained, 
thereby reducing the proportion of defendants who would be 
exposed to pretrial detention.239 In this scenario, overall 
detention decreased by 9% for a total detention rate of 18%.240 
Additionally, the false positive rate decreased to 8%.241 However, 
even though false positives decreased overall, there still existed a 
disparity of 7% in the false positives between Black defendants 
and White defendants.242  
3. Scenario 3: Hybrid Charge and Risk Based Approach  
In the final scenario, “Hybrid Charge and Risk Based 
Approach,” pretrial detention was reserved exclusively for 
defendants who fell into the highest two risk categories and were 
charged with a violent felony or domestic violence.243 This 
assumes that “most misdemeanor and non-violent defendants are 
not appropriate candidates for bail or detention consideration, 
 
 233 See id.  
 234 See id. at 11. 
 235 Id.  
 236 Id. at 12. 
 237 False positives for black defendants was 21%, 17% for Hispanic defendants, and 
15% for white defendants. Id. at 11, 13. 
 238 See id. at 11. 
 239 See id.  
 240 Id. at 11–12.  
 241 Id. 13. 
 242 Id. at 11–13. 
 243 Id. at 11. Also, note the similarity of this approach to the one suggested by SB 10. 
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regardless of risk level.”244 Controversially so, this hybrid 
approach recognized that “charge alone is not a good proxy for 
risk, and that some individuals with violent charges can be safely 
supervised in the community.”245 
For example, in 1999, Tom May, a 75-year old man, faced a 
murder charge for the “mercy killing” of his terminally ill wife.246 
May and his wife shared 50 years of a loving, happy marriage, 
but May’s wife begged to be put out of her misery once her 
condition began to deteriorate due to Lou Gehrig’s disease.247 One 
day, May gave his wife an overdose of her medication and then 
carried her into the car in the garage and started the engine.248 
He sat beside his dying wife for hours hoping to also die with her, 
but he lived.249 He was arrested and freed on $100,000 bail.250 
The seventy-six-year-old retired Navy officer later committed 
suicide.251 May’s situation is a prime example of a defendant 
facing a serious charge that presents virtually no risk to the 
community whatsoever.252 This is why the individual’s 
circumstances, rather than just their ability to post bond based 
on their charge, matter. 
This hybrid approach suggests a reduction in overall pretrial 
detention rates by 51% when compared to the other two 
scenarios.253 In contrast to the 27% overall detention rate 
presented by the “business as usual” model, only 13% would be 
detained under this “hybrid” model.254 Additionally, this model 
greatly alleviates racial prejudice in false positives: 16% for 
Blacks and Hispanics alike, and 14% for Whites.255 While the 
overall false positive rate is not as low as the “risk-based 
approach” model, the disproportionate detention by race is 
greatly decreased, and that is of utmost importance. 
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 245 Id. 
 246 See Tony Perry, Man, 75, May Face Charges in Mercy Killing of Wife, L.A. TIMES 
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Not only does this show that operating on a “business as 
usual” basis will continue to perpetuate racial inequalities 
present within the bail system, but it also proves that risk 
assessments can be used to even the playing field when used 
diagnostically.258 It is true that risk assessments used in isolation 
and without proper understanding of how destructive they can be 
can actually perpetuate these racial biases, especially in 
“jurisdictions where [B]lack, Hispanic, or other racial or ethnic 
groups have disproportionate contact with the justice system.”259 
However, this study substantiates that the argument ‘risk 
assessments perpetuate racial inequalities, and thus should be 
abandoned’ cannot actually withstand the statistics that prove 
the power of risk assessments when used correctly.  
“For more than two centuries, the key decisions in the legal 
process, from pretrial release to sentencing to parole, have been 
in the hands of human beings guided by their instincts and 
personal biases.”260 The Center for Court Innovation said it best:  
“Too often the debate over risk assessments portrays them as either a 
technological panacea, or as evidence of the false promise of machine 
learning. The reality is they are neither. Risk assessments are tools 
with the potential to improve pretrial decision-making and enhance 
fairness. To realize this potential, the onus is on practitioners to 
consider a deliberate and modest approach to risk assessment, 
vigilantly gauging the technology’s effects on both racial fairness and 
incarceration along the way.”261 
Diagnostic risk assessments do just that. This approach realizes 
that risk assessments can be a helpful tool when used modestly. They 
aim to release suspects early and often as long as it is safe for the 
community, and as long as pretrial services can assure the suspect 
will return to court. Gone are the days of pre-arraignment situations 
where defendants must frantically call their family members to help 
them post bond. Using the risk assessments diagnostically protects a 
defendant’s presumption of innocence if they are unlikely to harm 
others or evade court proceedings. 
 
 258 Id. 
 259 Id. 
 260 Angwin, supra note 201. 
 261 PICARD et al., supra note 203, at 14. 
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B. Solution 2: Form Pretrial Services as an Independent Branch 
1. Pretrial Services Should Not Be Under the Probation 
Department  
For the risk assessment tool to perform properly as a 
diagnostic, there must be a system of pretrial services in place. 
Ideally, these services would be provided by a stand-alone agency 
under the auspices of the court, separate from probation. Probation 
officers are not the best equipped to uphold one of the most 
significant pillars of our criminal justice system: innocent until 
proven guilty. Although probation was originally created with the 
intent to rehabilitate offenders, over the years, probation officers 
have increasingly taken on the tasks of law enforcement.262 
Probation officers deal with defendants who have already been 
convicted of a crime and now must be monitored in lieu of serving 
time in prison.263 A probation officer’s primary role is to “ensure 
that the offender does not engage in illegal or prohibited 
behavior.”264 While true that probation officers also help defendants 
find employment, stay out of trouble, and re-integrate into society, a 
probation officer’s relationship with their client exists because their 
client committed a crime; their presumption of innocence has 
already been rebutted. It would be a disservice to defendants to task 
probation officers with unlearning all their probationary skills to 
administer risk assessments and pretrial services to defendants at 
an entirely different stage in the criminal justice process.265 This 
would require a huge mental jump on the part of the probation 
officer and could lessen the efficacy and purpose of pretrial services.  
The same is true with peace officers. Peace officers are 
trained to detect crime.266 When a person gets arrested, is 
booked, and then seen by pretrial services, a peace officer will 
likely not presume innocence by default. Because of these 
reasons, it is of utmost importance that pretrial services are an 
 
 262 Marcus Purkiss et al., Probation Officer Functions - A Statutory Analysis, 67 FED. 
PROBATION 12, 12 (2003). 
 263 See Probation and Pretrial Officers and Officer Assistants, U.S. CTS., 
https://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/probation-and-pretrial-services/probation-and-
pretrial-officers-and-officer [http://perma.cc/T6CU-W75M] (last visited Jan. 3, 2021). 
 264 Probation Officer Career, PROBATION OFFICER EDU, 
https://www.probationofficeredu.org/probation-officer/ [http://perma.cc/R5E3-6N7H] (last 
visited Jan. 9, 2021). 
 265 See COLLIN DOYLE, CHIRAAG BRAINS & BROOK HOPKINS, BAIL REFORM: A GUIDE 
FOR STATE AND LOCAL POLICYMAKERS 25 (2019).  
 266 See Peace Officer Basic Training, POST COMM’N ON PEACE OFFICER STANDARDS 
AND TRAINING, https://post.ca.gov/peace-officer-basic-training [http://perma.cc/6GXT-
XAGW] (last visited May 20, 2020). 
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independent agency under the auspices of the court, not the 
probation department. 
2. What Services Should a Pretrial Service Agency Offer?  
It is vital for a pretrial service agent to have a background in 
social work. The goal of using risk assessment diagnostically as 
an enhancement, not a replacement, for judicial discretion is to 
put the “human” back into the process. Therefore, understanding 
the complexities of a person’s life is crucial.  
Additionally, it is important for pretrial services to operate 
independently, so it has the capacity not only to perform risk 
assessments, but to supervise defendants upon release. 
Additionally, the agency can offer mental health services run by 
professionals trained specifically in criminality, and it can 
oversee defendants released on Supervised Own Recognizance in 
a way that encourages the defendant to return to court. Further, 
the agency can offer phone call or text message reminders for 
low-level offenders, transportation services, and counseling. 
Following through with defendants is inevitably more work 
than handing them a paper stating their next hearing date and 
ordering them to appear in court. Probation and police agencies 
are already bombarded with other tasks and will not have the 
ability to carry out pretrial services to their full potential as a 
designated, stand-alone Pretrial Service Agency would. As such, 
the task must be entrusted to an agency equipped to handle it. 
C. Solution 3: Educate Judges 
1. Recognition of Bias 
Because risk assessments are only to be used diagnostically, 
judges will still retain their discretion if they find the defendant 
high-risk, or in some situations, medium-risk. Most, if not all 
judges will openly agree that racism is wrong. However, race may 
unintentionally factor into a judge’s decision. The concept that all 
individuals hold certain stereotypes and attitudes without 
conscious awareness is called implicit bias.267 Even judges who 
have taken an oath to be impartial protectors of the law struggle 
with implicit bias.268  
In a study performed on bail-setting in Connecticut, 
researchers found that judges set bail for African American 
 
 267 See Rachel D. Godsil & James S. Freeman, Race, Ethnicity, and Place Identity: 
Implicit Bias and Competing Belief Systems, 37 U. HAW. L. REV. 313, 314 (2015). 
 268 See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 
84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195, 1223 (2009). 
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suspects at an amount 25% higher than similarly situated white 
defendants.269 Killers of whites are more likely to receive longer 
sentences than killers of blacks.270 Federal judges impose 
sentences 12% longer on black defendants than on similarly 
situated white defendants.271 Judges cannot dismiss that implicit 
racial bias infects the entire criminal justice system. Even if 
judges do not actively make racially charged decisions, their 
subconscious biases still contribute to these racial disparities. 
Consequently, the question is not “if a judge holds implicit bias,” 
but “how do we unfold and unravel these biases.” The first step in 
undoing bias is simply recognizing that it exists. 
The good news is that the effects of these implicit biases can 
be remedied by making judges aware of their existence and 
prevalence.272 In a study where judges sensed their implicit bias 
was being tested, white judges consciously attempted to 
manipulate their determinations to cognitively correct any 
appearance of bias.273 This study shows that merely identifying 
the existence of implicit bias can have a positive impact, through 
self-correction.  
2. Implicit Bias Trainings 
Although it is proven that racial prejudice permeates judicial 
decisions, training must focus more on helping judges correct 
their bias rather than their racism. Judges want to protect their 
reputation and defend their morals. A judge who is supposed to 
act as a neutral magistrate does not want to admit they hold 
racist beliefs. Although implicit biases often manifest in racially 
biased actions, a judge will be more likely to participate in 
trainings that address bias than racism—a more politically 
charged concept. Simply calling these trainings “implicit bias 
trainings” might encourage judges to genuinely participate and 
learn, rather than make them defensive and unwilling to attend.  
3. Tentative Rulings on the Record  
Aside from acknowledging bias and dealing with it through 
training, further concrete actions must be taken when a person’s 
liberty is on the line before they have been adjudged guilty. If a 
suspect is not released prior to arraignment, or is held for a 
preventive detention hearing, the judge should first be required 
to make a tentative determination about release or detention on 
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 272 See id. at 1203. 
 273 See id. at 1223. 
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the record before the suspect ever steps into the courtroom. 
Judges will base this tentative ruling on the risk assessment, 
recommendation from Pretrial Services, and all case facts that 
exist at the time and presented to them.  
When a judge faces a defendant, his or her appearance, 
including their race, automatically signals to the judge their 
perceived likelihood of committing crime and their risk to the 
community. To illustrate, judges tend to view black men as 
“aggressive, criminal, dangerous, irresponsible, and intimately 
connected to drug use and trade.”274 Drug use and distribution 
are portrayed as “ghetto pathologies” that have invaded “White 
space[s],” instead of being an issue that both Black people and 
White people deal with.275 This makes it imperative for judges to 
be given all the case facts, incident reports, and any other 
necessary documents, with the defendant’s name and racial 
identification removed, and be asked to make a determination 
from the facts they have received from Pretrial Services without 
ever laying eyes on the defendant.276 Based on the information on 
paper, they must make a tentative ruling. Once the defendant is 
brought into the courtroom, and if the judge decides to change 
their tentative ruling, they must then state their reasoning on 
the record. 
This process does three things. First, it strips the suspect’s 
file of any explicit pieces of information that indicate their 
race.277 This eliminates the possibility of race being used as a 
factor for the judge to use when making his or her decision.278 In 
the absence of this information first presented on paper, the pure 
fact that the defendant is standing before the judge presupposes 
their criminality in a way that is more readily apparent, and 
thus, makes the judge more likely to err on the side of 
detention.279 Second, this method forces the judge to indicate real 
reasons apart from an amorphous and abstract sense of “danger” 
 
 274 Traci Schlesinger, Racial and Ethnic Disparity in Pretrial Criminal Processing, 22 
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 276 As previously mentioned, this is why it is imperative for the solution to be a mesh 
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from pretrial recommendations except in special circumstances. In New York City, once 
risk assessments were implemented, judges became more likely to follow pretrial 
recommendations and “when they did, subsequent court appearance rates improved 
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See Schlesinger, supra note 274, at 171–72. 
 278 See id. at 172. 
 279 See id. 
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that emanates from the defendant’s physical appearance.280 It 
forces them to look at the situation objectively. Third, this 
tentative ruling will make judges more aware of the effects their 
racially biased decisions can have. If a judge is unable to state a 
legitimate reason on the record for changing his or her ruling, the 
judge risks being overturned on appeal. Fourth, it will help 
judges further recognize his or her implicit bias. What many 
judges tend to do now is overestimate risk and overincarcerate 
pre-trial.281 If a defendant appears to be a good candidate for 
release on paper, but the judge feels the urge to detain them once 
the defendant steps into the courtroom, this is certainly telling of 
implicit bias. A tentative ruling on the record will require judges 
to introspectively examine their decisions. 
4. Diversity on the Bench  
Finally, to use risk assessments to enhance judicial 
discretion, there must be more diversity on the bench—diversity 
of gender, race, color, and thought. In the entirety of American 
history, only two of 113 Supreme Court Justices have been 
African-American men.282 In the entirety of American history, 
only five of the 114 Supreme Court Justices have been women.283 
Neither have ever been appointed Chief Justice.284 However, 
throughout American history, 107 of the 114 Supreme Court 
Justices have been White males.285 Thus, when our country 
portrays judicial authority, women and minorities are not in that 
picture, and are simply referred to as the “other.”286 If one of the 
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goals of bail reform is to put the human component back into the 
process, then it is vital to fill the bench with individuals who 
span various walks of life. At the end of the day, judges carry 
their life experiences, thought processes, and identities into the 
courtroom—which inevitably spill over into pretrial decisions. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
“You are where you came from. There are no disembodied 
selves. There are only humans embedded in practices, places, and 
cultures.”287 
It seems our cash bail system has lost sight of the fact that 
the humans filtered through the criminal justice system come 
from communities that raised them, families waiting at home for 
their return, and jobs that cannot wait until they are released. 
Our cash bail system assumes that a blanket monetary amount 
based on the crime charged is the fairest way to determine 
pretrial release. It fails to realize that these “practices, places, 
and cultures,” have contributed to the factors a judge weighs 
when determining risk. Because our cash bail system neglects 
this, we must ensure that any system we implement as part of 
bail reform does not. We cannot employ risk assessments at face 
value and neglect judicial discretion that allows for a holistic 
view of the facts. We must use these tools diagnostically to 
release as many as is safely possible. To prevent risk 
assessments from reducing the complexities of the human 
experience to group data, we must perfect the human element 
involved in the process.288 
Our current system does not presume a defendant innocent. 
It presumes them indigent, whether because of their race or 
not.289 If bail reform has any true hope of eradicating these racial 
inequalities, we must use risk assessments to guarantee that 
liberty is the norm for all, that pretrial detention is the carefully 
limited exception for all, and that the presumption of innocence 
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